러시아ㆍ유라시아

The crisis in the Middle East and North Africa, last December’s OSCE summit in Kazakhstan, the civil strife in Kyrgyzstan, and the escalating fighting in Afghanistan have combined to produce a resurgence of thinking about U.S. policy toward Central Asia. The key uncertainty now is whether, given all the captivating developments elsewhere and the resource-constrained U.S. government, the new thinking will result in new actions. While recent developments in the Middle East could fuel much-needed reform in Central Asian states, such changes will need continuous encouragement from Western governments to have a lasting impact.

BACKGROUND: The social disorders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and other Arab countries have invariably led Eurasian observers to see other autocracies, including those in Central Asia, as potentially vulnerable to a similar wave of popular upheavals. Some of the Central Asian leaders have been in power for many years, and only Kyrgyzstan has what can be considered a competitive multi-party system. Elsewhere, the political parties are either weak or tools of the regime. These five countries suffer from other maladies, including pervasive corruption, acute income inequalities, and transnational criminal groups that seem better able to cooperate across national borders than the frequently feuding governments of the region. Although other factors make the Arab scenario less plausible in Central Asia, that outcome cannot be excluded.

The World Bank has released new research documenting how Central Asia, along with Eastern Europe, suffered more from the 2009 global financial crisis than any other region in the world. Many people lost jobs and other sources of income, while their governments had fewer resources available to buffer their populations from the effects. The Bank’s president, Robert Zoellick, has warned that new problems – soaring food prices in Central Asia and declining remittances from Central Asians working outside the region – could lead to further economic hardships as well as political instability in the region. Although Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian countries have resumed their rapid growth, much of the recent progress is simply recovering from earlier losses and correlates with surging world oil and gas prices. These growth rates could easily slow following the next energy price slump or other external shock.

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff has released a study highlighting how contested water rights in Central Asia have the potential to escalate into interstate confrontations. At the same time, the Obama administration is having a hard time maintaining last year’s assistance levels to Central Asia now that the Republicans have regained a majority in the House of Representatives and called for massive reductions in non-military spending. Most countries will receive modest reductions from last year’s levels even if the Congress fully funds the president’s budget request, which is unlikely despite valiant administration efforts to link support for these countries to the well-funded war in Afghanistan. Central Asian countries allow the U.S. and other NATO members to send supplies through their territories, which lie along the Northern Distribution Network, to support their military forces in Afghanistan.

The limited amount of U.S. resources that have historically been allocated to Central Asia is one of admittedly many factors that have prevented the realization of many U.S. objectives in the region, ranging from greater political pluralism to deeper economic integration with world markets to less contested water and other resources. Even so, the administration has been slow to take such low-cost measures as sending a U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan, which has been without such a Senate-confirmed envoy for four years. Weak U.S. public funding for Central Asia is compensated by large private sector investment in some countries, but for some reason Kyrgyzstan, which lacks the large oil and gas deposits that attract foreign direct investment, would receive a ten percent reduction in U.S. aid under the administration’s budget request despite its civil tensions and struggling yet pluralist political system.

A recent report by the Central Asia Study Group and the Project 2049 Institute identifies other important if less ambitious U.S. objectives in the region, in the process offering a reason why Americans need to remain modestly involved in Central Asia even after all U.S. combat troops leave Afghanistan. These principal U.S. interests include preserving the autonomy of these five countries; diversifying their transit options; building the capacity of public institutions; and deepening Central Asia’s connections with the international economy. One benign feature of this list is that Central Asians generally seek the same objectives.

IMPLICATIONS: Opportunities do exist that, if correctly exploited, can lead to a better relationship between Americans and Central Asians. For example, China’s restrictions on the export of rare earth metals create new opportunities for Central Asian suppliers of these key components of many modern high-technology products. In addition, the scaling back of NATO military efforts in Afghanistan can encourage new thinking about appropriate regional security arrangements.

Geography alone guarantees that Beijing and Moscow will devote more attention and resources to Central Asia than will the U.S. In addition, Russian and Chinese policy makers can exercise more control over their assets — such as by coercing national companies to take larger commercial risks than a private U.S. company would accept — and share the skepticism of Central Asian leaders regarding Western-style democracy. Yet, the U.S. has a more visible diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the region than perhaps any other non-Eurasian country. Unique American strengths include the English language; scientific and commercial achievements; and Washington’s capacity to help Central Asians strengthen ties with global financial institutions and markets.

Another important U.S. and Western advantage is that Central Asian countries need Western commercial technologies to exploit some of their most promising oil and natural gas reserves, which are located in challenging geophysical conditions. Thanks to massive Western investment, the International Energy Agency forecasts that Kazakhstan’s annual oil production will reach approximately 140 million tons by 2020, 190 million tons by 2025, and slightly less than 200 million tons by 2030. If this oil flows westward to Europe, it will go far toward reassuring Western energy security concerns.

Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves, and its pivotal location, make it of strategic importance to the U.S. and its allies. But uncertainties regarding the development of democratic practices and the transition to the next generation of political leaders generate uncertainty about the fate of the Central Asian states. With the notable exception of Kyrgyzstan, most Central Asian leaders do not embrace Western-style liberal democracy. But the absence of clear succession plans for Central Asian governments remains of concern to long-term foreign investors who have poured more than US$ 120 billion into Kazakhstan alone since 1993. As the most prosperous of the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan should use the upcoming presidential election to assure domestic and foreign observers that the country is making progress toward an orderly democratic leadership transition when long-standing President Nursultan Nazarbayev leaves the scene.

The latest events in the Middle East might make Central Asian leaders more open to the need for an orderly succession when they leave office. State Department officials have testified that they have sought to “leverage” the events in the Middle East to induce them to make political and economic reforms. The best way for Central Asian countries to avoid the fate of several of the Middle East’s authoritarian leaders is to develop their political institutions through greater pluralism and civil liberties, which makes it easier for governments to identify and respond to their citizens’ needs. And citizens who can help shape their country’s public policies through elections and other legal political activities are less likely to resort to extra-constitutional actions.

CONCLUSIONS: Washington’s preoccupation with the Middle East, North Africa, and domestic politics risks overlooking this important region. As reported in the 03/16/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst, the Central Asian governments are reconsidering past policies and contemplating new policy directions, including developing stronger ties with the United States and its allies. But such initiatives will prove fruitless unless they find a receptive audience in Western capitals.

출처: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute