러시아ㆍ유라시아

Relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have become a barometer for and a troublesome symptom of the overall regional development in Central Asia. One year has passed since the tragic events of June 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan where a terrible clash took place between local Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Hundreds of Uzbeks were killed in the massacres. Allegations, investigations and analyses of the events are still filled with controversial interpretations and perceptions. Reactions to the international investigation of the conflict are telling of the lack of much-needed regional conflict mechanisms for conflict resolution in Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: In June 1990 and June 2010 tragic events occurred in the South of Kyrgyzstan, in the form of inter-ethnic conflict between the local Uzbek community and the titular nationals, the Kyrgyz. In both cases, massacres occurred between national groups who lived together and were “modernized” and “civilized” in the former Soviet state throughout the 20th century.

After one year, the clash between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz is still subject to different allegations and interpretations. It was a highly dramatic lesson for the so-called newly independent states of Central Asia, especially Kyrgyzstan and neighboring Uzbekistan. During the clash, the question of Uzbekistan’s interference or non-interference in order to save Uzbeks in Southern Kyrgyzstan was crucial for the further development of the conflict and its outcomes.

Immediately after the outburst of violence in the Osh and Jalalabad provinces, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov stated that the conflict was an internal affair of Kyrgyzstan. In September 2010, at the UNGA, he pointed out that both Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities became victims of well-planned and organized actions of a third force. Interestingly, Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbaeva expressed her official gratitude to Karimov for Uzbekistan’s non-interference, but called on Russia to help in coping with the tragedy. This statement added a certain geopolitical element to what was an internal affair of Kyrgyzstan.

Meanwhile, the events of June 2010 were investigated by the Independent International Commission (IIC), which was unique as the first international investigation of a conflict in the post-Soviet space. The IIC indicated four sides to the conflict; former President Bakiyev and his supporters; the new government headed by President Otunbaeva; the local Uzbek community; and criminal groups, mostly active in the drug trade.

In its Final Report, the IIC announced that about 500 people were killed in the massacre, of which 74 percent were Uzbeks and 24 percent Kyrgyz. The main reason for the conflict, according to the IIC, was political fanaticism that exploited ethno-nationalism. The IIC’s goals were fourfold: establishing facts; evaluating the events in the perspective of international law; figuring out personal and institutional responsibilities; and working out recommendations.

The overall content of the huge report was naturally critical. It did not qualify the conflict as a genocide or crime of war, as expected by Uzbeks, but found some tokens of crimes against humanity. It also pointed out massive violations of the rights of Uzbeks, especially political rights, a factor which was essential in the activation of the Uzbek community after the Bakiyev government’s fall in April 2010.

The IIC’s final report was followed by comments of the Kyrgyz government. The official position of the Otunbaeva government is that former President Bakiyev and his supporters who fled the country after the April 2010 revolution were behind the massacres. The Kyrgyz government’s comments were in turn critical towards the IIC’s report, rejecting the IIC’s conclusions as unbalanced and pro-Uzbek.

Thus, the overall investigation process and the subsequent official reaction to it revealed that the topic of ethno-nationalism remains not only highly politically sensitive but also doomed to a deadlock in the Central Asian context.

IMPLICATIONS: The Kyrgyz government’s comments state that the Kyrgyz provisional government was left to cope with the clashes in the south on its own without support from the international community and international organizations which are supposed to deal with this type of conflicts. The government may have referred to the OSCE, the CSTO or the SCO. However, none of these international organizations could intervene directly and effectively in the Osh and Jalalabad massacre. Neither the CSTO nor the SCO are instrumental in crisis resolution or peace-enforcement, because they are not authorized to do so by their Charters. Moreover, a large part of Kyrgyzstan’s leadership initially refused to receive even a small OSCE police group for conducting investigations, referring to Kyrgyz sovereignty and stating that they could scrutinize their domestic problems themselves.

The results of the IIC’s investigation and the reactions from the Kyrgyz government were all expected. It is unsurprising that the Kyrgyz side could not accept the IIC’s report without criticism, that the Uzbek side was unhappy with the IIC’s report, particularly because many Uzbeks still insist that the events should have been evaluated as genocide against them, and that the IIC’s report itself is not thorough enough to satisfy all sides. Indeed, the purpose of the Commission was not peacekeeping, but investigation. It was allowed to produce asymmetric results, possibly indicating one side as a victim and another as an aggressor. It is therefore quite symptomatic in the Central Asian context that a mutual lack of trust existing between the conflicting groups prior to the IIC’s investigation afterwards turned into mutual frustration.

The June 2010 events and their investigation are telling in terms of their implications for regional geopolitics, integration, and democratic development. It deserves mentioning that the Commission stated its recommendations were aimed at establishing the truth, achieving reconciliation and ensuring reparations to victims. No doubt, it did serve that purpose. At the same time, some serious questions remain unanswered and others still arise in the wake of this international intervention.

The concept of a state’s internal affairs in cases resembling the interethnic conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan is especially problematic and vague in the evaluation and interpretation of such a conflict. Indeed, would Russia have undertaken immediate measures to save Russians if the clashes would have affected the Russian community in Kyrgyzstan? There was an obvious risk that solidarity with the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan could have drawn Uzbekistan into the conflict, underlining the international conflict potential of domestic ethnic conflicts in the region.

Moreover, the Kyrgyz government accused the IIC of an unbalanced approach to the issue, but the question is whether this government’s own measures for reconciliation and criminal investigation will be more balanced and serve to establish the truth. Finally, a question of great importance is whether future relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will particularly depend on the extent to which an objective and independent investigation of the June 2010 events is conducted.

CONCLUSIONS: The IIC made a significant effort to attract international attention to the situation in Southern Kyrgyzstan and contribute to reconciliation between the conflicting communities. At the same time, there were limitations to the Commission’s mission. A stronger analysis of the situation is still needed. The problem is that while the 1990 and 2010 tragedies in Southern Kyrgyzstan were related to animosities between local Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and may have broken out for different reasons, they evidently have one fundamental cause. Perspectives on the immediate triggers of the conflict and consideration of its underlying causes may not lead to the same conclusions, and both the IIC’s report and the Kyrgyz government’s comments focused primarily on the triggers.

It is becoming clear after 20 years of independence that the abundance of nationalism and the lack of regionalism in both domestic policy and the regional relations between Central Asian countries are, in fact, the underlying causes of conflicts like that in Southern Kyrgyzstan. This not only perpetuates interethnic tension and mistrust within one country but also damages the integration process within the entire region.

From this point of view, we can assume that crisis prevention and peacekeeping instruments should exist at the disposal of Central Asian states themselves. In this particular conflict, a bilateral mechanism should exist between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for communications, exchanges, monitoring, and analysis of the situation in places like Osh and Jalalabad. This proposal at least implies a more adequate position and scope for actions than non-participation, distancing or solely issuing statements based of the misperception that the Osh events are a purely internal affair of Kyrgyzstan.

출처 : http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5599