아프리카ㆍ중동

CASE STUDIES:
Brazil’s Conditional Cash Transfer

Brazil is the most populous country in Latin America (LAC) with a population of 178,470,000 as of 2007. It was the first country to implement CCTs in LAC and has one of the biggest such program in the World today. Like many LACs, Brazil suffered serious inequalities in1970s (Lindert et al., 2007; Hobbs de la Briere, 2007).Whilst it registered smart economic growth in the late 1990s it had one of the highest inequalities, with a Gini coefficient of 54.2 and high poverty level (ODI, 2011). Up until the year 2000 these inequalities persisted (Santos et al) as were evidenced in the unequal access to social services such as health (Szwarcward et al., 2013). In Brazil CCTs is based on the assumption that people are poor because of the unjust social structures (Lindert, et al., 2007).Thus country embarked on investment in social protection programs as a way to pay ‘historical injustices’ and today it has one of the best systems among the middle income countries (ODI,2011).

The first CCTs in Brazil were launched in 1995 in two different municipalities. Bolsa Escola (BE) was launched in Distrito Federal, while Guaranteed Family income (PGRFM) was launched in Campinas municipality. These two programs provided the model that was later adopted in other municipalities and the state. Following the success of these programs the government started supporting them in other municipaliti

es that did not have enough funds to sustain the programs. Most of the programs were scaled up when they were taken over by the government (Lindert et al., 2007).

Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) was created in 2003 as a reform program combining the existing four CCTs in Brazil (Santos et al.). The BFP is unique because of the speed of its expansion, being implemented in a decentralized context, integrating four CCTs programs into one, and is used as a unifying social policy in Brazil (Lindert et al., 2007). The program is the most cost efficient social protection program, costing only 0.4 % of GDP, while covering the largest number of beneficiaries (ODI, 2011). As of 2007 the program had covered 20% of Brazil’s population (ADB, 2008).

BFP operations are well regulated in the5564 municipalities in Brazil. In 2004 the country published a regulation that promotes access to public services: health, education, social protection and protection against hunger and food insecurity, support for families living in extreme poverty and poverty and a sustained fight against poverty.  This established the basis for cash transfers to families facing these challenges and includes pregnant and breast feeding women, children in the age bracket of zero and twelve years and adolescent children between 12 to 15 years. The upper age for the adolescent children was later capped at 17. The program required beneficiaries to comply with certain minimum conditions such as attending prenatal and post-natal clinics, 85% minimum school attendance and meeting nutritional conditions. The implementation of the program was shared among three key players; the ministry of Social Development (MDS), the Federal Bank-Caixa Economica (CEF), and the municipalities (Santos et al.).

However, being a decentralized operation and covering a huge number of beneficiaries this program was prone to coordination challenges. Thus Brazil established minimum technology infrastructure requirement for managing the BFP within each municipality and a standardized procedure for managing of the benefits including identification of eligibility, inclusion in the family registry-Cadastro Unico (CadUnico) and monitoring compliance (Lindert et al., 2007).

Data collection is the first important step in implementing CCTs. The accuracy of targeting reduces leakages of the benefits to the non-poor. Brazil’s success is due to the rigorous process of data collection, accompanied by high levels of accuracy and frequent monitoring. The municipalities are in charge of data collection. Based on family per capita, Brazil’s CCTs target the extremely poor, earning less than $ 25 monthly per capita income and the poor earning less than $48 monthly per capita. These figures are supposed to be revised to reflect inflation (Lindert et al., 2007). Targeting involves three elaborate steps requiring close coordination by the three Institutions as shown in figure 1.

Brazil’s CCTs targeting system and data consolidation

The payments are coordinated by a secretariat called Secretariat of National Citizens, established by MDS. Brazil’s  use of the bank system to pay beneficiaries helps to: i) enhance transparency, ii) promote efficiency because only few staff are involved in the transfers and there is no need for lining in the banks, iii) reduces clientelism because the authorities do not handle cash directly and,  iv) improves self esteem of the beneficiaries (Lindert et al., 2007). And to avoid adverse effects of the transfers, the benefits are issued on a rolling basis over a period of 10 days every month. This roll-out plan helps to avoid long ques at withdrawal points and protects local economies from sudden surge of money. Payments are made to women based on a test experience which indicated that the women are more likely than men to use the additional money for education, health and welfare of their children. Generally the amounts range from $ 7-45, covers up to five children per household who must be aged between 0 and 17 (Santos et al., 2011). Brazil’s CCTs doubled since 2002, and amounted to $3.2 billion, representing 0.36% of its GDP (Lindert et al). 

The main purpose of the monitoring CCTs is to ensure optimal accuracy, avoid leakages and streamline the operations of the program. The potential source of errors and fraud for the CCTs in Brazil is the registration process as it is prone to manipulation by politicians. To deal with these ‘pressure point’ the government has put in place a number of checks and balances,  including, determining eligibility centrally, biannual recertification of beneficiaries, federal monitoring of the quality of registration, financial incentives for performance and formal and social controls. In addition, the government instituted pre- election measures barring registration at the eve of elections to prevent the potential use of the program for political influence. The government is also barred from carrying out impact evaluations in the election period. Nonetheless the risk of political interference with the geographic allocation of the program quota has been greatly minimized by the fact that the program is already attained universal coverage of the poor in Brazil. This reduces chances of manipulation which can easily occur when there is beneficiary rationing (Lindert et al).

The Brazilian CTs like those in other countries aim to develop human capital by linking them with access to basic services such as education, health and nutrition. The basic premise is that availability of these services does not always mean the poor will take them up because of direct or indirect opportunity cost. As such CCTs are important in ensuring the goal of building an inclusive sustainable society through human capital development is met. Brazil’s CCTs conditionalities require a minimum of 85% monthly attendance of schools by children aged between 7 to 17 years. Regarding health, the conditions require women to complete vaccines as per the schedule, monitor child growth and go for regular health clinics as well as pre-natal and post-natal clinics. In addition household heads are required to participate in nutritional seminars (Santos et al).

Brazil government adopted two ways of evaluating the impact of the CCT program. The ‘Core impact’ evaluation is a comprehensive one focusing on the effect of the program on food expenditure, anthropometric data of beneficiaries, nutritional variation, and household expenditure on basic services: clothes and health, Impact on school outcomes and access to health care services. On the other hand, specific evaluations are done focusing on specific aspects of the impacts of BFP. This includes BFP impact on local economy, social services, social capital, empowerment and gender issues, school performance and nutrition, food security among others. The World Bank has evaluated the internal and external evaluation of BFP program and gave it a full score of 1.0 (Lindert et al).

Brazil, like many Latin American countries was one of the most unequal countries in the world with very high GINI index between 1975 and 2000. However, a survey by the UNDP found that since the beginning of the implementation of the BFP program GINI dropped by about 28% and out of which 21% is attributable to CCTs program (Soares et al., 2006). Another survey revealed that annual family food expenditure by Program beneficiaries was $172 higher than that of families not enrolled in the program (Oliveira et al., 2007). Moreover, food purchases by those who suffered severe food insecurity rose by 79% as a result of the Program. The program also lowered the rate of school absenteeism and low dropout rates. Evidence suggests that Brazil has achieved 97% of school enrolment, and that 92% of those in the poorest quintile are enrolled. (Lindert et al).
With regard to health, the program has had a positive spill effect on children beyond the age bound by the conditionalities as they too went for regular health check-ups and monitoring. Similarly, the program significantly reduced child mortality arising from poverty related causes such as malnutrition and diarrhea for children under 5 years of age (Rosella, et al., 2013). On child nutrition, beneficiary children were 26% better placed to have age appropriate height and weight, while children aged between 12 to 35 months, were 19% more likely to have adequate height. (Paes-Sous, Miazaki & Santos, 2011).

Cash Transfers In Malawi

CCTs in Malawi reveal that the reasons for implementing these programs differ in developing countries, especially Africa. According to Garcia and Moore (2012), the growth of CCTs in Africa is because the other sources of social assistance have failed and new challenges emerged: emergency food aid has failed bring food stability, increasing migration and urbanization have changed family structures and weakened traditional safety nets. For example the elderly who were traditionally taken care of by the family are today left alone. Furthermore, HIV/AIDs have posed insurmountable challenge in Africa due to the increase in number of orphans and the vulnerable children (OVC).

Malawi is a small country in Southern Africa with a population of 14 million and a high level of poverty, having a GNI per capita of $ 750 as of 2007(World Development Indicators Database, 2008). It also has the highest prevalence of HIV/Aids in Africa, with 14% of its adult population infected with the scourge (UNAID, 2006). The CCT program in Malawi is a pilot program supported by World Bank and implemented by an NGO (Kidd and Calder, 2012), and links the CCT to sexual behavior change in effort to reduce HIV/AIDs. The program is based on the belief that education and poverty reduction among women are key in combating HIV/AIDs. Thus the CCT is implemented as a way to increase school enrollment, keep the beneficiaries in school, change their behavior in the short run and reduce poverty in the long run (Baird Et al).

Malawi’s CCT is implemented in Zomba District in the Southern part of Malawi, a region with the highest rate of school dropout, lowest educational attainment and the highest prevalence which are believed to be a result of poverty. The program targeted girls aged between 13 and 22 and included dropouts who have been out of school for two years or less and girls who were in school at the time of starting the program. Identifying the beneficiaries is done through door to door visit to all households in the area and administering a questionnaire by the NGO staff. This resulted in 3821 eligible girls out of which 931 were sampled to receive CCTs, while 299 were sampled to receive UCCT, while the rest did not benefit. The conditionality required the beneficiaries to have a school attendance of 80% in order to receive the cash (Baird et al.)

The Malawi CCT was pays hard cash both directly to the girls and to their parents or a proxy identified at the time of registering. The locations were changed every month due to security reasons (Baird et al.) In addition, school fees are paid directly to the school for the beneficiaries who are in high school. The amounts received ranged between $5 and 15 dollars and are simply randomly allocated to the beneficiaries by asking them to participating in a lottery (Kidd and Calder, 2012).

Monitoring compliance with the conditionality required both teachers and girls to report to the NGO on enrollment and attendance. Those who failed to meet the attendance requirement did not receive cash for that month but would receive her benefits the following month if she fulfilled the conditions. Monitoring progress is done by the NGO by administering a questionnaire every month the parent and girls went to receive their benefits:  parents are asked about family assets, household roaster, living conditions, consumption and household access to other safety nets. On the other hand, girls respond to issues relating to their family background, her education, labor market participation, and awareness about HIV/AIDS, sexual behavior, dating patterns and marriage expectation. They also provided information about their marital status and pregnancy and use of certain goods such as soap, mobile phone, clothes and drinking habits (Baird Et al.)

The result of the evaluation of the program showed remarkable results: school enrolment and literacy among the beneficiaries increased and they stayed in school. Similarly, there was decline in teen pregnancy, early marriages, sexual activity and sexually risky behavior. Interestingly, UCCTs had greater impact in reducing early marriages and teenage fertility than did CCTs (Baird Et al).

A comparison of Brazil and Malawi CCTs shows striking differences and few similarities. Like many other social transfers, the CCTs in Brazil and Malawi acknowledge that poverty is a problem with far reaching consequences on the general welfare of the society. They also recognize that social transfers can improve education attainment, solve health related issues and reduce intergenerational transfer of poverty. Both of them sought to increase human capital development in the beneficiaries.

However there are glaring differences between the two CCTs. First, the Malawian CCTs was mainly helping to address sexual related challenges such as HIV/AIDs prevalence, teenage pregnancy and early marriages. On the other hand, the Brazil focused on reducing poverty, inequality and child mortality.  Secondly, in Brazil data collection is rigorous and involves many institutions and processes, while in Malawi this task is done by the NGO and does not involve many procedures. Thirdly, while the Brazilian CCT relied on cutting edge technology for implementation especially in targeting and monitoring the program in Malawi doesn’t use advanced technology and mostly rely on trust on the information given by the teachers, parents and beneficiaries. Fourth, in Brazil’s case cash transfers were restricted to women to maximize benefit to family. Malawi case is different as cash was directly paid to girls. Fifth, In Brazil the amount of cash beneficiaries receive depends on the level of poverty, while in Malawi this is done by simply taking part in a lottery. Sixth, unlike in Brazil where all success is attributed to CCTs, in Malawi UCCTs were more effective in certain areas like reducing early marriage and fertility than CCTs. This means that the impact depends on who is being targeted and the goal to be achieved. Seventh, the program in Brazil transfers cash through the bank while in Malawi it paid hard cash. However, little is shown on the impact this on the recipients. Finally the CCT in Malawi was implemented for just two years and the results were overwhelmingly positive. In Brazil CCTs have been there for more than ten years. It will be interesting to study how the length of such a program can influence its outcomes or the incentive it can creates.

Implementing CCTs have some challenges. First is targeting the poorest or the most deserving. This requires accurate identification of potential beneficiaries. Secondly, monitoring compliance with conditions may be a big challenge especially to countries without sufficient technological infrastructure to facilitate monitoring. Third is the provision of services and availability of service providers. In some cases the capacity of institutions to accommodate beneficiaries and provide quality services is still a problem and service providers may be less or not well trained. Fourth is the question of sustainability of the programs. In most countries CCTs are co-sponsored by the World Bank and the government. But there is also a question of how to sustain beneficiaries when they enter middle income class. Can CCTs result in middle income trap? Finally, transparency is challenge in many programs. Lack of transparency on identifying beneficiaries can result in conflicts within the community. In Brazil this is avoided by information dissemination and inviting all potential beneficiaries to apply and then conducting interviews. It can also be solved through high community involvement in identifying deserving beneficiaries.

Nonetheless, despite different objectives for Brazil’s and Malawi’s CCTs, in both cases results show tremendous achievements by the CCTs. In both countries school enrolment rose and dropout rates reduced. Brazil also registered reduced inequality, child mortality and increased consumption among beneficiary households. In Malawi the impressive results were in reduced teenage pregnancies, delayed marriage and change in sexual activity among beneficiaries. These results point to the success of CCTs in achieving its intended goals.
However, in order to achieve the desired goals, CCTs need to be carefully designed and implemented. Their success heavily relies on advanced technology which aids accurate data collection and monitoring both of the program and of compliance with conditionalities. They also need enhanced institutional capacity to provide adequate services on which compliance is attached, such as education and health. Furthermore, CCTs require seamless integration and cooperation among institutions to facilitate information sharing. Transparency is necessary and can be achieved by involving the community. When CCTs are prolonged they can create wrong incentives. Therefore they should have an entry and exit strategy. Exit strategy can include a graduation agenda linking beneficiaries to other social assistance services such employment bureaus or higher education training to increase their employability. In Brazil CCT grandaunts are linked to auxiliary services upon graduation.

While these cases underscores that CCTs may be successful in reducing inequalities by enhancing investment in human capital, they also point to the fact that CCTs can be successfully implemented in Africa despite technology deficiency. Countries that do not have advanced technology do not have to abandon CCTs all together. They can either implement UCCTs which requires less technological infrastructure or implement CCTs in small scales as the case of Malawi.