러시아ㆍ유라시아

Global LNG trade has stabilized at 250 million tons (mt) since the last four years. On a global level, domestic production and pipeline volumes continue to account for the majority of global gas supplies, at 69% and 21% of the total (respectively). However, LNG has made rapid progress over the past two decades. LNG production has expanded by an average 7% per year since 2000, far faster than the 2% growth registered by domestic production and the 4% growth seen for pipeline gas1).
From the end of 2008, eleven new countries came to LNG market and three of them during past 2 years. Many of these countries were not considered potential LNG importers a decade ago and the US, which was then expected to be the largest LNG import market by now, has seen imports slow to a trickle. In 2013 the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific were two biggest LNG suppliers with 42% and 30% of the world's LNG respectively. Form the other side, Asia remains a key market for global LNG demand.
Russia held the world's largest natural gas reserves about a quarter of the world's total proven. The state-run Gazprom controls most of it and produces about 75% of natural gas output. However, based on the company's forecasts, Gazprom's market share will continue to shrink with a 25% decline in production from existing fields by 2020, a 75% decline by 2030. This trend appears linked to waning demand in the European market, long the key consumer of Russian gas, although Gazprom plans to offset this decline by tapping into new fields.
The recent evolution of natural gas global market dynamics has begun to undermine Russian position. Today the country in a fix with a lot of challenges, i.e. the U.S. shale gas revolution, tightening competition on the global LNG market and new pipeline projects, and the main challenge is Western sanctions. After Russia announced the cancellation of the South Stream project, Russian authorities started emphasizing the need to pep up LNG project development in Russia, but the country is still underdeveloped in this sense and operates only one LNG plant. From the other side Russia has a lot of paper plans to construct something huge that should impress the whole other world but all these projects still up today have been gathering only dust in the drawers. And we regret to empathize that current Russia's market position becomes more uncertain day by day as competition rises fast on the global LNG market.
Moreover, as main Russian gas export is oriented to Europe and post-USSR countries, the Kremlin continuously underestimates the importance of Asian markets on global level. The situation tightens for Russia literally every day making her future presence on Asian market more and more uncertain. Rising supplies from faster, closer and more sophisticated and capable in the technical sense LNG producers such as Australia, the United States, Canada and even East Africa create a significant danger to Russian market share on the LNG market. Still the main question is whether Russian gas will be competitive under market conditions given the high production and transportation costs. Necessary investment into production cycle from expansion and export infrastructure till final consumer will be crucial, as mentioned before Russia suffers from lack of investment that because of economic sanctions after Crimea annexation and engaging in hybrid war supporting terrorist and separatist movements in the Eastern Ukraine.
In spite of huge natural gas reserves Russia has only one operating LNG facility, Sakhalin II. The project is owned and operated by Sakhalin Energy. Shareholders of Sakhalin Energy are: Gazprom Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (subsidiary of Gazprom) holding 50% + 1 share; Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) holding 27.5% – 1 share; Mitsui Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (subsidiary of Mitsui) holding 12.5%; Diamond Gas Sakhalin (subsidiary of Mitsubishi) holding 10%. Contracts for the supply of LNG have been signed mostly with Japanese companies, Shell Eastern Trading and KOGAS.
Today looks like Sakhalin Energy face certain difficulties as no investment decision has been forthcoming in relation to expanding LNG plant, problems securing financing and buyers will likely delay both Sakhalin projects (Sakhalin III and expanding of existing capacities).
The most promising and tangible current Russian LNG project is Yamal LNG project, envisaging the construction of an LNG plant with annual capacity of 16,5 mt per year. It's a joint venture of about $27bln distributed between main three shareholders: Novatek, the largest independent gas producer in Russia with 60%, French Total with 20% and China National Petroleum Corporation with 20% respectively. The interesting fact is that Total has joined Novatek for an LNG project on Yamal peninsula in effect as a substitute for collapsed Shtokman project (one more as huge as unsuccessful or just unsuccessfully huge Gazprom's flagship project that was cancelled in 2012) that was in Total’s portfolio. Today Yamal LNG project experiences certain financing problems. In response to Russia’s military escalation in Ukraine, the United States frozen the assets and restricted travel of 31 Russians and Ukrainians oligarchs and state authorities, that affected billionaire Gennady Timchenko (one of these 31), who owns 23,5% of Novatek. As well Novatek was placed under the U.S. sanctions, limiting its access to global financing. In spite of it, still Yamal LNG is key to Putin's drive to maintain Russia's energy dominance, finally to enforce position on global LNG market and be not so stacked to pipeline.
Moscow has long term ambitions to double its LNG market share by 2020 (currently at around 4,5%), and to hit 20% by the end of the next decade2). The Kremlin has introduced a list of measures, including tax incentives, LNG export liberalization, etc. to make it real. But, taking into consideration the present geopolitical climate, Russia may have a hard time moving forward with all its LNG projects and castles in the sky and even with "successfully" implementing (at least as Kremlin claims) Yamal project. Russia's economy has on the 'oil and gas needle' since a second decade and heavily dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, the sharp decline in oil prices raises very serious questions about the economic viability of many of these projects.
Russia urgently needs to adjust or completely eliminate its old Soviet rules to develop its energy sector. And that is the root of evil. Conventional oil and gas fields provide 90% of the current production, but the sector is now facing existing fields going into decline phase. In Soviet period, especially during 1960-1980s, oil fields were overused. Moscow did not think about technological improvements having combination of immense reserves and extraction low cost price. The result was lack of new technologies and oil and gas engineering weakness. Despite many warnings the country did not invest enough in technological upgrade and new fields. Later in 2000s with high oil prices most of the oil-production enterprises in Russia enlisted the co-operation with foreign companies. It was the combination of foreign technology skills, experts and service companies that makes Russia vulnerable to the Western sanctions, which are clearly targeted at potential growth sectors of the Russian energy economy where new energy technology and expertise will be required. Although no direct sanctions were imposed on the gas sector, rather technology sanctions on the oil sector have had some spill-over effects on the gas sector ability to get finance has been significantly limited. Furthermore, the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU mean that Russia will have to seek alternative financing options for ongoing LNG projects.
So Gazprom turns back to old-fashioned pipeline projects. After more than 10 years of negotiations the agreement on construction pipeline to China was reached. The planned "Power of Siberia" pipeline is expected to start around 2019. But there are still a lot of questionable matters over it and the main one is the price of supplied gas. This agreement already has affected one of prospective LNG projects. Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller claimed that the company is ready to consider the possibility of pipeline gas export to China as an alternative to the Vladivostok LNG project and to deliver the volumes allocated to Vladivostok LNG as pipeline supplies to China National Petroleum Corporation or China National Offshore Oil Corporation3). The fact that Gazprom has all but cancelled the Vladivostok project due to concerns that LNG liquefaction technology might be added to the sanctions list was left by Mr. Miller just behind the scene. As well the main possible project stake-holder Gazprombank is under sanctions and restricted to borrow long money. It's going to be much cheaper just to extent existing Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok pipeline to China than be engaged in new LNG facility construction.

____________

1) International Gas Union 'World LNG Report - 2014 Edition'. http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-field_file/IGU%20-%20World%20LNG%20Report%20-%202014%20Edition.pdf, last accessed 25 October 2015.

 2) Reuters 'Russia's Yamal LNG sees global liquefied gas deficit by 2018', http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL5N0VK3BM20150210, accessed 25 October 2015.

3) Independent Chemical Information Services (ICIS) 'Gazprom could scrap Vladivostok LNG for pipeline', http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2014/10/15/9829141/gazprom-could-scrap-vladivostok-lng-for-pipeline.  last accessed 25 October 2015.

[ Reference ]
Independent Chemical Information Services (ICIS) 'Gazprom could scrap Vladivostok LNG for pipeline' (2014). http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2014/10/15/9829141/gazprom-could-scrap-vladivostok-lng-for-pipeline, last accessed 25 June 2015.
International Gas Union 'World LNG Report - 2014 Edition'. (2014). http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-field_file/IGU%20-%20World%20LNG%20Report%20-%202014%20Edition.pdf, last accessed 25 October 2015.
3) Reuters 'Russia's Yamal LNG sees global liquefied gas deficit by 2018', http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL5N0VK3BM20150210, accessed 25 October 2015.