연구정보
Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
인도ㆍ남아시아 기타 국외연구자료 기타 Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Egorov, Georgy Enikolopov, Ruben World Band 발간일 : 2015-07-01 등록일 : 2015-08-21 원문링크
Summary:Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.