아프리카ㆍ중동

Any type of interaction climate, be it synergistic or antagonistic, is delineated by a tandem of dimensions: trust in authorities and power of authorities. Advocates for this assumption are the manifold of empirical studies testing the “slippery slope framework” which subsumes the two dimensions. A major proffer advanced by the framework is that tax authorities’ approach towards citizens poses great influence on compliance, either fuelling or hindering it. Irrespective of whether tax burden level is high (e.g., Scandinavian, Continental welfare states), medium (e.g., East European, Anglo-Saxon welfare states), minimum or completely lacking (e.g., tax havens), tax authorities and taxpayers establish a connection in which the former’s actions are mirrored in the latter’s perceptions about leadership’s benevolence in public good provisions (i.e., trust) and efficiency in deterring tax evasion (i.e., power). The tandem trust-power and the specific features of such connections within some countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa tax climate (i.e., Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) are the thrust of the present study. The methodology spans a multidisciplinary approach, from explaining trust and power via governance indicators proposed by the World Bank, investigating economic development with chain base indexes and examining tax compliance process on country-level. The MENA region is source for novel and relevant insights on the nexus between trust, power and compliance, as it hosts countries which vary greatly in terms of economic development (transition to developed), fiscal policy (low to no taxes) or economy drivers (oil exporters, oil importers) and where tax compliance gains importance amid diminishing hydrocarbon resources. Nowadays economic realities constrain MENA authorities to refocus their governing strategies and perceive taxation as a viable future solution for budgetary expenses. Therefore, analyzing trust in authorities and power of authorities within MENA serves both national authorities in their quest to identify new strategies of financing state budgets and taxpayers in understanding the key role they play for securing the common good. Regarding both trust in and power of authorities, oil exporters are better off than oil importers, registering higher levels. Nevertheless, oil importers strive to improve perceptions of trust and power among citizens, benefiting from international assistance