중남미

During the Cold War era, US decision makers made extensive use of covert action to bring about regime change in a number of countries. In the context of examining US covert action in Guatemala in 1954, I attempt to assess the motivations of American decision makers for opting for covert action as a particular means of foreign policy. From the perspective of ‘external constraint’, covertness is undertaken to deceive target countries, to avoid conflicts with other stakeholders, and to skirt negative international opinion. From the perspective of ‘internal constraint’, secrecy is undertaken to circumvent domestic opposition against involvement in target countries. By and large, the outcomes of this case study lend credence to the explanation provided by the former perspective. By going underground rather than using overt military force, US decision makers attempted to circumvent negative international publicity that open aggression toward Guatemala would have brought. Circumstantial evidence also suggests that by using covert action, US decision makers were able to minimize the domestic public-relations risk associated with overt involvement in the region.