연구정보
[경제] Through the Looking Glass : Lessons from the World Bank Afghanistan Portfolio for FCV Engagement
아프가니스탄 국외연구자료 연구보고서 - World Bank 발간일 : 2022-12-16 등록일 : 2023-01-08 원문링크
This paper aims to provide a gateway to the lessons learned from 7 critical years of program implementation (out of the 20 years of World Bank engagement since 2001) leading up to the political events of August 15, 2021. This will both support ongoing efforts to safeguard some gains of the long-term engagement by development partners and inform potential future interventions when the enabling environment would allow for a more comprehensive program. At the end of this report, we outline five initial takeaways (scope, adjustability, impact of analytics on design, sustainability, early thinking about transitioning between off and on-budget) that the World Bank and partners are testing in Afghanistan in the initial 12-14 months’ engagement post August 15, 2021. Following the political events of August 15, 2021, in Afghanistan, the World Bank paused all disbursements in its portfolio of 29 projects and over the next nine months repurposed this funding in Afghanistan. Reviewing the lessons from the paused portfolio was critical to the decision to make funds available again. By end-August 2022, the World Bank had completed 23 full Implementation Completion and Results Reports (ICRs) for its projects, in addition to five Non-Completion Notes (NCOs) for projects that had not become effective or disbursed. Currently, one regional project in the pre-August 2021 Afghanistan portfolio remains active. Pausing the disbursements under these projects meant that all activities halted as of August 15, 2021. The recently published country portfolio review of the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI 2022) covers the same period (2014-21) as in this lessons learned document and draws three main conclusions: (a) comprehensive support should only be provided in the context of a viable and inclusive political settlement (and this was not the case in Afghanistan), (b) support should not finance paramilitary operations by police and security agencies (which the UK support did), and (c) spending levels should have been adjusted based on more thorough scenario planning. The authors will come back later in this paper to issues (a) and (c), as the same lessons also came up in the ICR: the limitations on the ability of government to deliver major programs under a political settlement that was not inclusive (and effectively meant the country remained in conflict) and the limited adjustability in programs are elements that deserve more reflection when engaging in similar situations and contexts in the future and should have a bearing in particular on the breadth and depth of support.
본 페이지에 등재된 자료는 운영기관(KIEP) 및 EMERiCs의 공식적인 입장을 대변하고 있지 않습니다.
