Why did America's twenty-year war in Afghanistan fail to establish a self-sustaining non-Taliban government? Analysts have cited cultural obstacles in Afghanistan, bureaucratic inertia in Washington, and a lack of strategic commitment, in part because Iraq dominated national security policy. Such claims tend to draw evidence from Germany, Japan, and Iraq, places where the U.S. military achieved some measure of success establishing pro-American governments. The present article broadens the comparison to consider Afghanistan alongside Germany, Japan, Iraq, and two examples of post-Cold War regime-change success: Panama (1989–1990) and Haiti (1994–1995). The cases indicate that U.S. influence in the postwar environment has depended on the prospects for integrating old regime elites into the new government and on the strength of indigenous opposition forces. Both variables were unfavorable in Afghanistan, and they shaped the boundaries of political order—no matter how hard U.S. forces fought or how long they stayed.