After 9/11, the Pakistani state’s decision to abandon the Taliban (friends) under U.S. pressure and later to become a “frontline” state in the war against terrorism had led to a massive change in the “strategic security paradigm” of the Pakistani security establishment. This strategic policy U-turn transposed the state’s long-held strategic partners and friends (Taliban) into brutal enemies in the war against terrorism in Pakistan. This article critically analyzes the enigmatic situation in which these friendly forces emerged as brutal actors in the war against terrorism and empirically examines the strategies and tactics that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), adopted over time to create panic and fear to gain political leverage during military operations against them. This paper also highlights tactical mapping of TTP and its affiliates, its ideological grounding, and critical analysis of the perilous relationship between the state and Taliban forces as the Afghan jihad presents a state of war on terror.