러시아ㆍ유라시아

※ 출처 : Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, the biweekly journal of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Two decades after the notorious Osh riots, large-scale violence has recurred in southern Kyrgyzstan, resulting in thousands of deaths and injuries, and 400,000 refugees. In the aftermath of April’s unexpected change of government, the weak Kyrgyz state proved itself nearly powerless to prevent local clashes from occurring and sometimes escalating. In Jalalabad, sporadic street demonstrations in May turned violent, and in one instance divided along ethnic lines—between Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority. On June 10, unidentified gunmen sparked a pogrom against the Uzbek minority and the destruction of much of the city’s residential and commercial districts. The implications for Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asia are far-reaching.

BACKGROUND: Unlike the Tulip Revolution 2005, the major events leading to the April 7 overthrow of President Kurmanbek Bakiev took place in Kyrgyzstan’s north. However, when Bakiev refused to leave the country and took refuge in his family’s village outside Jalalabad, the south became a focal point for political struggles. After a week spent trying to negotiate the terms of his resignation, Bakiev hastily fled the country, but not before sparking violent clashes between his supporters and his detractors. 

Bakiev’s exile did not herald a restoration of stability. On April 30, a non-political scuffle between Kyrgyz and Uzbek businessmen in Osh (a city with roughly equal numbers of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks) fed rumors of inter-ethnic violence. On May 13, groups of protesters seized control of the government headquarters in the three southern regions and were forced out by larger groups supporting the interim government the next day. Dozens were injured in the process. Following the reestablishment of control of the buildings, some of the pro- government demonstrators — among them, allegedly, ethnic Uzbeks loyal to Jalalabad businessman and politician Kadyrjon Batyrov — marched to Bakiev’s village and burned down several homes belonging to Bakiev’s family. On May 19, several thousand people marched on the People's Friendship University — an institute financed and run by Batyrov primarily for Jalalabad’s Uzbek community — and demanded Batyrov’s arrest. His supporters fired weapons from inside the university building, killing two and injuring dozens, before the police intervened.

It now appears likely that the Jalalabad clashes had two effects. First, they showed that the state could not stop armed mobs from advancing political agendas and destroying property.  It was now apparent that law enforcement agencies did not have control in the southern regions, implying that further organized violence could not be prevented, and perpetrators would have little fear of being caught and punished. Meanwhile, a reservoir of potential foot soldiers was available to participate in demonstrations and organized violence: idle young men who do not earn enough money to raise a family and who feel powerless to change their fate.

Second, the dominant narrative explaining political struggles in the south had now turned from support for Bakiev to ethnic affiliation — whether one is Uzbek or Kyrgyz. Acts of violence in the south would readily be interpreted as “ethnic” violence and rumors of inter-ethnic provocations could be seized upon to mobilize people. It would not be surprising if the perpetrators of the June violence had begun their preparations at this time. This would involve recruiting young men, acquiring and distributing weapons, planning coordinated attacks, and creating a storyline that would take shape through deliberately disseminated malicious rumors.

Five simultaneous attacks by unidentified masked gunmen at crowded points in Osh on the night of June 10 lit the fuse. In the following days, mobs armed with automatic weapons, homemade knives, clubs, and Molotov cocktails marauded throughout the city targeting Uzbek businesses and neighborhoods in what can only be described as a pogrom.  Eyewitnesses charged that elements of the Kyrgyz military abetted the marauders — at the very least, for three days they did little to stop them. In the chaos, many non-Uzbek businesses were also destroyed in fires, including the city’s major bazaars, and Kyrgyz people were also killed in the crossfire and reprisal attacks. However, most victims were Uzbeks. By June 16, 400,000 Uzbek refugees—half the Uzbek population of Kyrgyzstan—had fled to the border with Uzbekistan.

IMPLICATIONS: Both inside and outside the region, many have been preoccupied with the question: Why did it happen? In the rush to explain the sudden outbreak of violence, several culprits, including “Russia”, “Tajiks”, and “The Bakievs” were fingered as suspected agents provocateurs. There is no credible evidence supporting any of these allegations, and it should be noted that the interim government has an interest in scapegoating Bakiev and his family — although their involvement should not be ruled out either. Another possible instigator is local criminal figures who would benefit by eliminating competition from Uzbeks in Osh’s (licit and illicit) economy. At a minimum, no one disputes that the outbreak of violence was not spontaneous.

However, “provocation” is not the whole story. In interviews with the international media, refugees described wanton killing, rape, and sadistic acts of cruelty, sometimes accompanied by chauvinistic anti-Uzbek and nationalistic slogans. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that, once violence was set in motion, such acts were carried out in numerous locations by ordinary people, who took advantage of the disorder to settle scores or unleash pent-up resentment and hatred against ethnic Uzbeks. Some of this violence was fed by malicious rumors alleging rapes and other horrific acts perpetrated by one or the other ethnic community. To lay the blame exclusively on external provocateurs is psychologically reassuring because it precludes asking uncomfortable questions about one’s friends and neighbors, but ethnic Kyrgyz citizens will eventually have to reckon with culpability within their own ranks—a small minority to be sure—to make reconciliation possible and prevent future conflict.

By way of explanation, some journalists have described the Fergana Valley as an “ethnic tinderbox” that was destined to “explode”. Yet few anticipated this turn of events, and indeed, observers both inside and outside the country were shocked at the scale and viciousness of the violence. This points to a paradox: by most accounts, inter-ethnic relations prior to this summer had been improving, not deteriorating. While maintaining negative stereotypes about one another — as is usually the case in areas of mixed ethnicity — Uzbeks and Kyrgyz nonetheless worked side by side, lived in increasingly integrated neighborhoods, and sometimes intermarried. The vast majority of people in both groups were content to leave in peace. Yet a series of incremental steps and a sudden triggering event were enough to shatter this stability. In hindsight, it may appear inevitable—but it was not.

Looking ahead, the security vacuum in Kyrgyzstan is a cause for continuing concern. In 1990, interethnic clashes in Osh ended (after 300 deaths) only when Moscow imposed a curfew and sent tanks into the city. Today, there is no equivalent external source of stability. Both Russia, through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the U.S./Europe have signaled their reluctance to intervene. This is not surprising, as the U.S. sees Kyrgyzstan as strategically unimportant — with the exception of its military base at Manas — and Russia seeks to maintain influence but does not want to involve itself in a messy, urban conflict. However, without a state that is strong enough to impose order and trusted by all of its citizens, each community will live in fear of the other and normalcy cannot return to southern Kyrgyzstan. 

An aggravating factor is that both sides’ fears are exacerbated by mutual misperceptions.  As often occurs after cases of intercommunal violence, people on opposing sides have developed contradictory narratives about victimhood and blame, focusing on their own losses and downplaying casualties on the other side. Such diverging perceptions can prevent reconciliation and provoke new violence, as acts of self-defense may be perceived as acts of aggression. The current Kyrgyz government, in its reluctance to establish and make public facts, whomever they implicate, and its refusal to acknowledge the ethnic character of much of the violence, has inadvertently encouraged the hardening of self-serving — and sometimes apocryphal — competing narratives. 

A pervasive climate of fear and the outbreak of more violence will make it less likely that refugees will return home (as the perpetrators would no doubt desire). Refugees must weigh the (meager) opportunities that await them as stateless citizens against the risks of returning to their homes in Osh. If the majority of refugees refuse to return to Kyrgyzstan, the demographic landscape of Central Asia will be transformed. Kyrgyzstan, which under President Akayev prided itself on its multinational harmony, was a model for the greater region, especially in contrast to civil conflict in the Caucasus. Now, to the chagrin of Kyrgyz themselves, it represents to much of the world a failure to administer a multiethnic state and serves as a warning to other multiethnic states, in the Fergana Valley and beyond, which believe they have found the right formula to preserve peace.

CONCLUSIONS: Even if most refugees return to their homes, it is not an exaggeration to say that southern Kyrgyzstan has changed irreparably. The economic foundation of Kyrgyzstan’s second city has been completely destroyed. The fragile trust that gradually emerged after the 1990 riots has been shattered for at least a generation. While the state remains weak — perhaps even irrelevant — power now lies with local actors who can assemble groups of armed men, like the ones who precipitated the attacks. Unless a neutral peacekeeping force is dispatched to the region, locals cannot be confident of their physical security, and there is little that stands in the way of further violence.