러시아ㆍ유라시아

※ 출처 : Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, the biweekly journal of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Kyrgyzstan is today the only Central Asian state where political forces advocating a parliamentary system still have a strong voice. These forces represent a mixture of political leaders’ good will and their pursuit of a share of power in an environment where political competition is robust and memories of the two “revolutions” are still fresh.  The recent ethnic violence in Osh and Jalalabad added serious hurdles to Kyrgyzstan’s ambition of becoming a parliamentary state. Yet, if enough efforts are invested into rebuilding trust between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in south Kyrgyzstan, a parliamentary system could still be accomplished.

BACKGROUND: While everyday tensions between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan have always existed, there was no apparent reason for inter-ethnic violence to break out at this moment. Both groups had learned ways to peacefully co-exist despite scarce access to water and land for nearly two decades. Inter-ethnic ties between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were strong enough to keep the peace in the region even though the economic and political cleavages between these groups had widened after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Uzbeks dominate the business sector, but are underrepresented in governmental structures.

Kyrgyzstan’s new government, which took power in a violent uprising just two months ago, has made it clear that it intends to treat the Uzbek minority on par with Russians. Thus, the government translated the new constitution into three languages; Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek.

However, despite interim president Roza Otunbayeva’s efforts to engage all citizens to vote in the referendum, the violence in southern Kyrgyzstan underscored the weakness of the provisional government and its inability to quell civic unrest. Reports about the possibility of inter-ethnic provocations were available to the provisional government weeks before the recent unrest, but little was done to address this or prepare for a worst-case scenario. As violence spread across Osh in the morning of June 11, the Kyrgyz military (made up predominantly of ethnic Kyrgyz) acted chaotically, often reacting to rumors spread by provocateurs. The military and police lacked the equipment and communication devices needed to respond quickly and contain the violence. “I am ashamed to confess, but the military lacked the fuel to reach places”, one military official said.

The provisional government’s weak response to the unraveling crisis was combined with the deposed president Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s careless treatment of the Uzbek minority during his five years in power. It took only a few hours for tensions and panic to spread across southern Kyrgyzstan. According to unofficial estimates, the clashes took as many as 2,000 lives, while 400,000 ethnic Uzbeks fled their homes.

IMPLICATIONS: The violence in Osh and Jalalabad has unveiled both the ugly and the beautiful in Kyrgyz society. Kyrgyz journalists have been struggling to choose their words while describing atrocities and causalities and yet maintain a balance. Personal memories of what happened during June 10-15 flooded Kyrgyzstan’s loosely regulated online forums; apologies, accusations, calls for action, political campaigns, and hate speeches inundated media outlets and everyday conversations. Local leaders of the Uzbek diaspora and Kyrgyz officials have been engaging in peace talks, stating that violence was unexpected by both sides and needs to be prevented. Bishkek residents have been collecting humanitarian aid, while some Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh and Jalalabad are doing what they can to calm tensions on their own. Overall, the Osh and Jalalabad violence is condemned across the country. Local NGO leaders have mostly proven to be ethnicity-blind and have acted to support both ethnic groups.

But the military forces and some political leaders continue to use force to deal with the unrest. On June 21, Kyrgyz forces raided villages populated by Uzbeks to extract weapons and persecute alleged instigators of inter-ethnic confrontation. Frustrations among both ethnic groups as well as other minority groups over the country’s future have been growing.

The Osh and Jalalabad crisis complicated the already uneasy political climate in the country. One week ago, most discussions in the media centered on the question of whether the upcoming elections would be free and fair. Today, the question Kyrgyzstan faces is whether it is possible to restore the inter-ethnic balance that disappeared just days ago.  

Interim president Roza Otunbayeva’s decision to hold the referendum as planned was criticized by her opponents and some international organizations. Some argue that holding the referendum on time would signify the interim government’s disregard for the Uzbek population. Refusing to postpone the referendum “could seriously undermine the referendum's legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and contribute to the sense of alienation of many southerners”, argues a recent publication of the International Crisis Group.

Proponents of an early referendum, however, argue that if the provoked violence forces the provisional government to postpone the vote, more provocations will follow in order to continue destabilizing the situation in the country. As analysts in Kyrgyzstan assert, Otunbayeva’s government needs to gain legitimacy to move forward with reforms. If parliamentary elections are held in October, Otunbayeva’s government will be compelled to encourage ethnic minorities to enter political competition and elect their own representatives in parliament.

Otunbayeva will continue to be under pressure from her fellow interim government members to prevent ethnic minorities from gaining power. But such politicians will likely attract strong criticism from their opponents, NGO groups, and society at large. No politician, be that the Ata-Meken party leader Omurbek Tekebayev or Social Democratic Party leader Almazbek Atambayev – both struggling to gain a majority in parliament – will be able to sustain a stable political and social environment without the support of ethnic Uzbeks who make up over a million of Kyrgyzstan’s population.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the recent violence is that while it is important for the Uzbek refugees to return to their native cities and villages in Kyrgyzstan, inter-ethnic reconciliation is a necessary precondition for stability across the entire country. If Kyrgyz politicians prove unable to restore inter-ethnic peace, efforts to build a parliamentary system might be equally futile. The violence in Osh and Jalalabad highlighted the significance of the government’s active promotion of a civic nationalism, which would establish a framework for peaceful interaction between the ethnic majority and minorities. It demonstrated that in the absence of a professional – rather than ethnic – army and police, a parliamentary state is no more than a political slogan.

If Kyrgyz political forces as well as the international community use this moment and emphasize the importance of inter-ethnic peace, Kyrgyzstan’s experiments with a parliamentary system of governance could become a milestone in Central Asia’s post-Soviet history. Kyrgyzstan’s provisional government therefore desperately needs external support to rebuild inter-ethnic trust between the ethnic majority and minority groups in Osh and Jalalabad. 

CONCLUSIONS: Overall, there are three primary areas where Kyrgyzstan needs immediate help from the UN and OSCE to stop the violence. First, the leaders of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities in the region, as well as local entrepreneurs and religious leaders, must be engaged in a dialogue to build trust. Second, the capacity of the Kyrgyz police and its military to quell inter-ethnic tensions must be enhanced. Third, public debates engaging experts with various backgrounds must be organized in various media channels.  Fortunately, Kyrgyzstan has the necessary preconditions for this sort of intervention – despite the recent bloodshed; it is still the only state in Central Asia with a viable and active political opposition, professional NGOs, and independent journalists.