러시아ㆍ유라시아

※ 출처 : Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, the biweekly journal of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Uzbekistan’s reaction towards the violence ravaging southern Kyrgyzstan  has been consistent with its broader attitude towards neighbors and Uzbek co-ethnics in the region. While condemning the clashes, Tashkent has emphasized that these constitute Kyrgyzstan’s domestic affairs and do not reflect the historical spirit of harmonious co-existence that has defined Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations. Rather, it has hinted at the possibility that the events may have been orchestrated, implying that a key role in igniting the Osh and Jalalabad provinces may have been played by factions loyal to the ousted president Bakiyev.

BACKGROUND: Uzbekistan’s attitude towards cross-border Uzbek co-ethnics has defied predictions dating back to the early post-independence period that Tashkent would engage in irredentist policies, or at the very least would act as the patron of Uzbeks abroad. Quite to the contrary, Uzbekistan’s leadership has made respect for state sovereignty a key dimension of its domestic and foreign policy. Contacts with Uzbeks abroad have been limited, and officialdom has traditionally refrained from commenting on the conditions of the co-ethnics in the neighboring republics, preferring underground operations and contacts.

Not only has Tashkent not intervened but it has also looked at Uzbek co-ethnics with caution and even suspicion. Uzbeks abroad are not seen as Uzbekistan’s ‘own Uzbeks’, and thus are not of Tashkent’s concern. When refugees, including some ethnic Uzbeks, escaping from Afghanistan and Tajikistan’s civil wars in the 1990s sought a safe haven in Uzbekistan, the latter sought to impose restrictions to the number allowed into the country. Refugees have been construed as posing a challenge to the order the regime seeks to impose. Afraid of cross-border ties and the free flow of ideas and people that a more open border regime would entail Tashkent insisted on tight border control.

After nearly a decade of friendly bilateral relations during which each country developed its own distinctive path to independence and model of state-building, Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan relations deteriorated in 1999, following the February 16 assassination attempt against President Karimov in Tashkent, which the authorities claimed was perpetrated by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Apart from disputes over land (including border demarcation) and resources (water and gas supplies) Uzbekistan became increasingly exasperated at what it regarded as Kyrgyzstan’s inability to control its own porous and poorly patrolled borders. The cross-border incursions by IMU militants over the summers of 1999 and 2000 appeared to provide evidence to Uzbekistan’s case. Seemingly more worried about consolidating his own domestic power base than cracking down on militants, former president Askar Akayev became a sort of ‘strawman’, embodying the weak state that Uzbekistan saw at the origins of its own problems, namely the spillover of instability from beyond the border (or so the argument went).

Disagreements over how best to fight Islamist extremism aside, Uzbekistan was caught aback by the speed at which the Akaev regime crumbled in 2005. In order to prevent being next in a series of unraveling post-Soviet regimes, Karimov enacted a series of measures  further narrowing down the spaces of pluralism within the country. The Andijan events of May 2005 came next, and when Uzbekistan demanded Kyrgyzstan’s cooperation by returning those who had found refuge on its territory, Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s new regime, seeking international legitimacy, refused. Uzbekistan’s secret services were widely reported to tackle such issues unilaterally through undercover operations, and relations between the two neighbors worsened significantly.

Within a couple of years an already weak Bakiyev regime finally gave in to Tashkent’s requests, and a number of Uzbek citizens began to return, many as a result of coercion. The atmosphere of cooperation did not last long, as Bakiyev’s plans to seek Russian investment to development the Kambarata hydropower stations elicited immediate and vehement opposition in Tashkent, since these would have a negative impact on the farming and cotton economy in Uzbekistan.

After Bakiyev’s overthrow this year, Uzbekistan has been slow and reluctant to engage the new Kyrgyz leadership. Despite explicitly pointing to the domestic nature of the April 2010 events, Uzbekistan has been alarmed by the ease with which regimes collapse and change next door. Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s concern with religious extremism has been the main prism through which its leadership looks at events in the Ferghana valley. Securing borders and ensuring control of population flows are high on Uzbekistan’s agenda, where fear of spillover of instability from across the border is a constant nightmare scenario.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the latest ‘revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan kept its border with its neighbor tightly sealed. Thus, when the first reports of the clashes spread during the night between June 10 and 11, 2010, the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was still shut. It was only on June 12 that Uzbekistan agreed to take refugees in, following increasing domestic and international pressure and facing a situation where thousands of people were seeking to desperately leave Kyrgyzstan. The border stayed open until June 14, when the Uzbek authorities decided to close it again. Officially set at 45,000, the actual number of refugees is thought to be much higher, possibly reaching 75,000. Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Aripov justified the decision to close the border by pointing to the country’s inability to cope with such large number of refugees. This has prompted mounting criticism of both its border and refugee policy from both international and domestic humanitarian and human rights organizations. Indeed, official Tashkent has been forced to choose between policy consistency (a tight border regime) and pressure to allow some relief to refugees of predominantly Uzbek ethnicity.

Initially, families fleeing the violence were welcomed in private homes in the Andijan province. This move was soon reversed by the authorities and refugees (only women and children have been allowed into the country) have since been hosted in camps, where severe movement restrictions have been imposed by the Uzbek authorities in an attempt to prevent individuals to move around and possibly become untraceable.

The crisis unfolded while a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was taking place in Tashkent. On that occasion, President Karimov pointed out that Uzbekistan’s position on events in Kyrgyzstan is “clearly reflected in the statement of the Uzbek Foreign Ministry made on April 9, 2010”. Emphasizing that these are “an internal affair of Kyrgyzstan”, Karimov laconically concluded that “that says everything”. Apart from President Karimov’s brief remarks, the only official statement was delivered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 12. The statement conveyed two main messages. First was the condemnation of “unpunished killings, violence, pogroms”, noting that these were primarily perpetrated against members of the Uzbek community. Second was the interpretation of the events. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that rather than being a spontaneous outbreak of  interethnic violence, the actions have “an organized, manipulated and provocative nature”, with the aim to instigate (rather than being driven by) inter-ethnic animosities. The statement emphasized the long tradition of friendly relations between the many ethnic communities living in Kyrgyzstan. 

CONCLUSIONS: As the tragic events of June 2010 unfolded, Uzbekistan acted consistently with its prior attitude to questions of territoriality, sovereignty, and citizenship. It has re-affirmed that whatever takes place within the territory of a neighboring country falls within the remit of that state’s domestic affairs. Moreover, the wisdom of any type of involvement (military or other) within Kyrgyzstan’s territory currently appears questionable in Tashkent. Caution has been accompanied by an uneasy balance between concern over a possibly uncontrolled flow of refugees who would then disperse across the country, and pressure from both international and local humanitarian organizations to provide a more pro-active form of humanitarian relief.

In this regard, a noteworthy debate on how to best deal with the crisis has come to the fore, revealing how Uzbekistan’s official stance may not meet everyone’s expectations. Local NGOs and human rights organizations have demanded that the authorities take a more open stance to protect Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. However, such a move, apart from contravening two decades of regional policy, would entail a type of involvement that goes beyond humanitarian relief. This would imply the further unraveling of the Kyrgyz state, presumably an issue of even greater concern in Tashkent.